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STRATEGY AND COMPLIANCE WITH
BILATERAL TRADE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS: USTR'S




Covenants without the sword, said Hobbes, are but words. Indeed,
an agreement between States that settles a trade dispute is only words
unless the parties comply with its terms. Agreement compliance,
however, can be achieved without the sword. Compliance with bilat-
eral trade dispute settlement agreements depends upon strategy fitted
to trade policy goals and effective execution of that strategy by trade
negotiators. This paper draws from theories of interstate conflict, for-
eign policy, arms control, and bureaucratic politics in order to explain
the American strategy of bilateral trade dispute settlement and com-
pliance pursuant to section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended
in 1979, 1984, and 19881 (section 301). Strategy and compliance with
bilateral trade dispute settlement agreements is investigated through
case studies of U.S.-initiated disputes with East Asian States regarding
allegations of unfair trade practices.
This study examines three questions: What are the characteristics
of an optimal bilateral trade dispute settlement agreement for the
United States? What strategy does the Office of the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) employ to negotiate an optimal settle-
ment agreement? What are the characteristics of a U.S.-initiated trade
dispute settlement agreement which receives substantial compliance?
Regarding the first question, the following argument is made here:
an optimal trade dispute settlement agreement maximizes the attain-
ment of national possession and milieu goals, and negotiation goals.
* Visiting Assistant Professor of International Business, School of Business Administration,
University of Michigan. I gratefully acknowledge the suggestions for this research of Michael
Bressler, Ross Denton, Gary Hawes, John H. Jackson, Harold K. Jacobson, Christopher Len-
hardt, Michel Oksenberg, Robert Snyder, and MICH. J. INT'L L. Article editor, Mary Shimizu;
and the financial support of the Institute for the Study of World Politics and The University of
Michigan Rackham Graduate School. However, none should be held responsible for the argu-
ments presented in this article.
1. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988).
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As to the second question, it will be shown here that USTR typically
promotes milieu goals, such as strengthening of the norms of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade2 (GATT) in support of posses-
sion goals such as commercial competitiveness. Finally, regarding the
third question, a settlement agreement tends to receive substantial
compliance when (1) expected trade behavior is clearly specified, (2)
expected trade behavior is implementable, (3) effective monitoring
procedures are specified in order to detect noncompliance, and (4) pos-
itive and/or negative incentives for compliance are offered.
The paper proceeds in five parts. First, the conceptual linkages
among strategy, goals, and agreement compliance are developed. Sec-
ond, the study research design and findings are reported. Third, the
strategy of trade dispute settlement negotiation is discussed with re-
gard to bureaucratic politics. Fourth, case evidence that illustrates
the key study findings is reviewed. Finally, effective monitoring and
the notion of unilateral surveillance within the context of the present
GATT-based, multilateral trading system are explored.
I. STRATEGY AND TRADE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
National policy goals should drive the strategy of interstate con-
flict resolution. 3 Government trade negotiators, it follows, should aim
to achieve national policy goals when attempting to settle bilateral dis-
putes regarding unfair trade activity. Pursuing national policy goals
through bilateral dispute settlement of unfair trade practices involves
matters of both foreign and domestic policy for the State participants.
The States attempt to settle their dispute within the context of their
broader bilateral diplomatic relationship, while at the same time at-
tempting to settle the dispute in a way that balances domestic policy
needs against foreign policy demands.
National policy goals do not appear only as either foreign or do-
mestic priorities. They also relate to power and wealth, or politics and
economics, respectively. Thus, it is the contention of this study that
bilateral trade dispute settlement relates to foreign and domestic poli-
tics and economics.
A State's foreign policy is itself goal-directed activity.4 States, ex-
plains Arnold Wolfers, aim to achieve with their foreign policies two
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
3. The following analysis owes much to the theory of strategic bargaining expounded by
Thomas Schelling in his seminal work, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960).
4. Anderson, Foreign Policy as a Goal Directed Activity, 14 PHIL. SOC. SCi. 159 (1984).
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types of goals: possession goals and milieu goals.5 Possession goals
involve enhancement or preservation of something to which the state
attaches value, i.e., a possession. Examples of possession goals include
territory and tariff preferences. Milieu goals involve a State's attempt
to shape conditions beyond its national boundaries, L e., its milieu. Ex-
amples of milieu goals include peace and support of international eco-
nomic regimes.
Government trade negotiators have both possession and milieu
goals. Possession goals of the trade negotiator include commercial
competitiveness, full employment, economic growth, social stability,
aggregate national income, price stability, adequate balance of interna-
tional payments, resource mobility, equitable income distribution, and
interest group support. Milieu goals of the trade negotiator include
global welfare, free trade, fair trade, the GATT regime, stability, pre-
dictability, peace, and friendly diplomatic relations.
6
However, the government trade negotiator as an implementer of
foreign economic policy may not share with the policymaker all of
these national goals. The trade negotiator's mission is more limited; as
an international agent for the citizen, he must solve an international
problem for the citizen. Thus, the trade negotiator has another, addi-
tional type of goal-negotiation goals.
First, posited from the theory of arms control, the negotiator will
attempt to draft a settlement agreement that will receive substantial
compliance. 7 A settlement agreement without substantial compliance
invites renewal of the dispute. Second, posited from the theory of bar-
gaining, the negotiator, mindful that the present trade dispute likely
will not be the last, will also attempt to bargain in such a way that a
relationship of mutual respect and trust-if not sympathy and
warmth-between the counterparts is constructed.
8
Under certain circumstances, however, the trade negotiator, in the-
ory at least, may aim at drafting a settlement agreement that will not
5. A. WOLFERS, DISCORD AND COLLABORATION: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
73 (1962).
6. See generally Krasner, State Power and the Structure of International Trade, 28 WORLD
POL. 317, 317-318 (1976); I. DESTLER, MAKING FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 1-18 (1980) (case
studies illustrate what goals trade negotiators have); S. LENWAY, THE POLITICS OF U.S. INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE (1985) (role of interest groups in defining U.S. national interest in trade pol-
icy); D. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 17 (1985) ("in any given attempt, states may-and
usually do-pursue more than one goal with respect to more than one target"); Goldstein, Ideas,
Institutions, and American Trade Policy, 42 INT'L ORG. 179 (1988) (State institutions determine
American trade policy).
7. See generally T, SCHELLING & M. HALPERIN, STRATEGY AND ARMS CONTROL (1985)
(various aspects of arms control negotiations).
8. Eg., I. ZARTMAN & M. BERMAN, THE PRACTICAL NEGOTIATOR 27-41 (1982).
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find substantial compliance or may aim at antagonizing his or her
counterpart negotiator. However, the trade dispute settlement cases
studied here bear out the norm, not the exception.
Government trade negotiators, however, typically cannot achieve
all of their goals. The goals are sometimes complementary, sometimes
contradictory. Furthermore, the other protagonist may frustrate the
achievement of some goals. Hence, dispute settlement agreements
codify goal achievement trade-offs. Trade negotiators seek an optimal
settlement agreement, Le., an agreement that maximizes national and
negotiation goal attainment. The trade negotiator must assign values
or weights to each national and negotiation goal when pursuing a
maximizing strategy. Interviews suggest that trade negotiators assign
values akin to "high," "medium," and "low" to their goals.9 How
trade negotiators value goals is discussed below in the section entitled
Negotiation Strategy and Bureaucratic Politics.
Bilateral trade dispute settlement sufficiently resembles bilateral
arms control treaty-making to suggest that arms control theory could
be usefully applied to bilateral trade dispute settlement. For example,
the purpose of both trade dispute settlement negotiation and arms con-
trol negotiation is to change the vital national policies of a sovereign
State. In both trade dispute settlement and arms control, negotiators
aim to ensure that agreed-upon policy changes actually do occur.
Arms control theory suggests that a treaty that meets with sub-
stantial compliance will possess certain characteristics. Arms control
treaty compliance depends upon (1) the clear specification of expected
behavior, (2) the adequacy of verification procedures in order to detect
noncompliance, and (3) the existence of incentives for compliance.' 0
As discussed below, under the test of the cases studied here, these
characteristics from the arms control experience stand up well in bilat-
eral trade dispute settlement.
However, an unstated premise of the arms control experience-the
capacity of a government to implement its settlement commitments,
i.e., its expected behavior-must be explicitly added as a condition for
substantial compliance in bilateral trade dispute settlement agree-
ments. Bilateral trade dispute settlement involves a greater risk of
noncompliance by the governments involved than arms control (which
has primarily been between the Soviet Union and the United States).
Though recent political problems in the Soviet Union raise questions
about contemporary Soviet political capacity, the governments of the
9. Interviews by author (Dec. 1989-Apr. 1990): Interviewees expressed comfort with the
terms high, medium, and low.
10. See, e.g., T. SCHELLING & M. HALPERIN, supra note 7.
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Soviet Union and the United States in the post-World War II era have
possessed the capacity to implement their settlement commitments.
Trade policy changes, on the other hand, truly challenge national
political capacity.
I. RESEARCH DESIGN AND FINDINGS
This study employs the case study method of structured, focused
comparison in order to analyze strategy and compliance with Pacific
Basin trade dispute settlement agreements. Social science methodolo-
gists explain that the case study method is excellent for initial theory-
building, even if conclusions remain tentative."
This study examines only disputes involving allegations of unfair
trade. Protectionist disputes which involve no claim of unfair prac-
tice, i.e., safeguard or escape clause disputes, are not included in the
study because in these types of disputes, the United States typically is
not trying to change a foreign government's trade policy. Rather, the
United States is simply trying to restrain imports in order to offer re-
lief to domestic producers. The U.S. goal in disputes regarding unfair
trade practices, on the other hand, is to change another government's
trade policy. Remedies for unfair trade practices have included elimi-
nation of an import quota, lowering of a tariff, or making an import
licensing procedure transparent. Hence, compliance issues come to
the fore in a way that they do not in escape clause cases.
This study examines comparatively and intensively nine cases of
U.S.-initiated trade disputes brought under section 301. (See Table 1.)
The nine section 301 cases studied here represent about forty-three
percent of the twenty-one section 301 cases formally initiated against
East Asian governments in the 1980s. 12 Only U.S.-initiated cases were
studied in order to hold the asymmetrical power relationship of the
trade disputants constant. Only Pacific Basin disputes were selected in
order to hold the diplomatic and foreign policy milieu relatively con-
stant. Only disputes initiated during the 1980s were selected in order
to hold the U.S. domestic and international economic and political
milieus relatively constant.
The cases were selected in order to vary the target State and mar-
ket involvement. The cases involve three key East Asian States (Ja-
11. George, Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Com-
parison, in DIPLOMACY: NEW APPROACHES IN HISTORY, THEORY, AND POLICY 43-68 (P.
Lauren ed. 1979); Achen & Snidal, Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies, 41 WORLD
POL. 143, 146-47 (1989).
12. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SECTION 301 TABLE OF CASES, Reference Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 49:0841 (April 19, 1990).
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301 case # unfair resolution
state market (USTR) activity dates
Japan footwear 36 quota 10-25-82
12-01-85
Japan tobacco 50 tariff 09-16-85
10-03-86
Japan semiconductor 48 access* 06-14-85
07-31-86
Korea insurance 51 access 09-16-85
07-21-86
Korea intell. prop. 52 protect 11-04-85
07-21-86
Korea footwear 37 customs 10-25-82
03-31-84
Korea beef 65 quota 03-18-88
11-13-89
Taiwan footwear 38 tariff 10-25-82
03-31-84
Taiwan rice 43 subsidy 07-13-83
03-22-84
* Note: This study does not consider the dumping parts of this case.
pan, Korea, and Taiwan) and a variety of types of markets
(manufacturing, high technology, agriculture, service, and informa-
tion-based). The research design, then, makes the study manageable
but also limits the conclusions. Because the conclusions here are
drawn from cases in which the two States have an asymmetrical inter-
state power relationship (i.e., U.S.-East Asian State), they may be ap-
plied with some confidence to similar situations but should be applied
only with great care to different situations. For example, compliance
in U.S.-European Community trade dispute settlement and cases
where the United States is a respondent await further research.
Each case study includes investigation about the business reasons
for bringing the case to the U.S. government, the filing of the legal
petitions which formally brought the case before the U.S. government,
the U.S. government decision to initiate the case, the U.S. government
investigation, the U.S. intrabureaucracy bargaining, the interstate ne-
gotiations, the dispute-resolving agreement, and the compliance
record.
The nine cases are summarized here:
[Vol. 12:799
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Japan, Korea, Taiwan footwear (three cases): Lawyers for the Foot-
wear Industries of America, Inc., the Amalgamated Clothing and
Textile Workers International Union, and the United Food and Com-
mercial Workers International Union filed a massive section 301 peti-
tion with USTR in October 1982.13 The petition, the text of which
alone ran to nearly 175 pages, complained of unfair trade policies to-
ward non-rubber footwear by the governments of Brazil, Taiwan, Ko-
rea, Japan, the European Community as a whole, as well as France,
Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom separately. Footwear Indus-
tries charged that these governments engaged in policies of excessive
tariffs, quotas, restrictive licensing practices, and subsidies.
Japan tobacco: USTR initiated a section 301 action against Japan for
its import policies regarding tobacco in September 1985.14 Ambassa-
dor Clayton Yeutter announced at the time of the initiation that, de-
spite some Japanese policy steps to liberalize their tobacco market,
Japan persistently maintained high tariffs, imposed discriminatory
rules on marketing, advertising, and distribution, and held a monopoly
on the importation and sale of tobacco products.' 5 The dispute cen-
tered on the activities of the State-owned tobacco company, Japan To-
bacco Inc., and five partially State-owned tobacco distribution
companies, the Tobacco Haiso companies. Japan Tobacco possessed a
monopoly on the import, distribution, and sale of all tobacco products
in the country.
Japan semiconductor: The (American) Semiconductor Industry Asso-
ciation (SIA) filed a section 301 petition with USTR in June 1985.16
SIA charged the Japanese government with a wide range of unfair
practices, from overt barriers such as quotas and tariffs, to more subtle
non-tariff barriers. SIA contended that the Japanese government had
identified semiconductors as an industry essential to its national eco-
nomic development and security and had targeted it as an industry to
be promoted. The Japanese government, said SIA, had encouraged a
small number of large, integrated electronics firms, such as Hitachi,
13. Petition for Relief under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as Amended on Behalf of
Footwear Industries Association of America, Inc., Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union and United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, T. Shannon, L. Howard,
& M. Kershow of the law firm of Collier, Shannon, Rill & Scott (October 1982) [hereinafter
Footwear Petition].
14. Japan's Practice with respect to the Manufacture, Importation, and Sale of Tobacco
Products, 50 Fed. Reg. 37609 (1985) (initiation of investigation under section 301).
15. Id.
16. Petition of the Semiconductor Industry Association before the Section 301 Committee,
Office of the United States Trade Representative, A. Wolff, R. Gadbaw, T. Howell, & T. Rich-
ards of the law firm of Dewey Ballantine (June 1985).
Summer 1991]
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NEC, Matsushita, Fujitsu, and Toshiba, to interlink their research,
development, production, and sales of semiconductors so that U.S.
firms could sell in Japan only certain types of semiconductors not pro-
duced by Japanese firms and only when there were spot market
shortages. SIA claimed that despite aggressive marketing efforts by
U.S. firms and despite its dominance of American, European, and all
other semiconductor markets, the U.S. market presence in Japan in
1985 remained what it had been in 1975-about ten percent.
Korea insurance: USTR initiated a section 301 investigation against
South Korean insurance trade policies and practices in September
1985.17 Several American insurance companies charged that Korean
government licensing restrictions prohibited them from competing in
the Korean life insurance and compulsory insurance markets. Com-
pulsory insurance is insurance required by the Korean government of
Korean citizens as a matter of national public policy. 18 The American
companies charged that the 1981 agreement between the United States
and Korea to open the Korean fire insurance market had been
thwarted by Korean government tolerance of the close business rela-
tionships among Korean insurance companies and banks. Korean
banks, according to American firms, "directed" their customers to
purchase fire insurance from Korean companies. 19
Korea intellectual property: USTR initiated a section 301 investigation
against South Korea's policies and practices regarding the protection
of intellectual property rights. 20 First, USTR investigated Korean
patent laws, especially regarding chemicals and pharmaceuticals,
which protected only the specific process for making the product, not
the product itself. Second, USTR investigated Korean trademark pro-
tection, which allegedly offered foreign firms little hope of redress with
regard to trademark infringements, because Korean courts employed a
"famous in Korea" test for trademarks. The courts had held that a
trademark merited protection only if it were well-known to Korean
consumers. Hence, products new to the Korean market, even if al-
ready well-known in other parts of the world, were denied trademark
protection. Third, USTR investigated allegations by the American
17. Korea's Restriction on Insurance Services, 50 Fed. Reg. 37609 (1985) (initiation of inves-
tigation under section 301).
18. Comments Regarding the Investigation into Korean Restrictions on Insurance Services,
R. Rivers, C. Fontheim, & S. Frank of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld
(October 1985).
19. Id. at 8.
20. Adequacy of Korean Law for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, 50 Fed.
Reg. 45883 (1985) (initiation of investigation under section 302).
[Vol. 12:799
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publishing, music, motion picture, and software industries that Ko-
rean piracy of their books, records and cassettes, films and video cas-
settes, and computer software was widespread and that Korean
copyright law offered little protection for foreign copyright-holders.
Korea beef- The American Meat Institute in February 1988 charged
in a section 301 petition that since May 1985 the Korean Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries had banned the importation of
American beef.
21
Taiwan rice: The (American) Rice Millers Association filed with
USTR in July 1983 a section 301 complaint against the Republic of
China (Taiwan), that charged the Taiwanese government with
purchasing rice from its farmers at prices significantly higher than
world market price, and then dumping the rice to selected countries at
below world market. price. 22 The Rice Millers alleged that the
Taiwanese government's price support system encouraged over-pro-
duction in Taiwan which depressed American rice exports.
Case study evidence was marshaled through (1) interviews with
many of the participants in the disputes, (2) U.S. government docu-
ments from the Departments of Commerce and State, USTR, the In-
ternational Trade Commission, and Congress, (3) GATT documents,
(4) legal briefs and documents filed with the U.S. government by trade
lawyers for the disputants, (4) correspondence among U.S. govern-
ment officials, East Asian government officials, and private trade law-
yers available in public files of the U.S. Department of Commerce and
USTR, and (5) press accounts in The International Trade Reporter,
The Journal of Commerce, The New York Times, The Wall Street
Journal, The Far Eastern Economic Review, and other Pacific Basin
region periodicals.
The nine cases of trade disputes between the United States and
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan studied here were settled by agreement.
(See Table 2.)
The nine settlement agreements codify trade-offs among the pos-
session and milieu goals of the trade negotiators. Among the posses-
sion goals sought by the trade negotiators were commercial
competitiveness, domestic interest group support, improvement of the
U.S. balance of payments, and maintenance of domestic employment.
Since in all these cases the United States aimed to either open markets
21. Petition for Relief under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended, on Behalf of
the American Meat Institute, P. Rosenthal, L. Lasoff, & R. Beeckman of the law firm of Collier,
Shannon, Rill & Scott (February 1988).
22. Section 301 Petition of the Rice Millers' Association, B. Fisher & S. Schneebaum of the
law firm of Patton, Boggs, & Blow (July 1983).
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Table 2
CASE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
case unfair activity settlement agreement
Japan footwear quota eliminate quota
Japan tobacco tariff eliminate tariff
Japan semiconductor access 20% foreign market share
Korea insurance access open market to foreign
companies; make
licensing transparent
Korea intell. prop. protect draft domestic IPR" laws;
sign int'l IPR treaties;
enforce strictly
Korea footwear customs change admin. procedures
Korea beef quota eliminate quota
Taiwan footwear tariff lower tariffs
Taiwan rice subsidy only sell in small country
markets
* Intellectual Property Rights.
or to expand intellectual property protection in East Asia, the U.S.
trade negotiators put a high priority on the possession goal of enhanc-
ing the commercial competitiveness of U.S. industry.2 3 By doing so,
the negotiators also sought, in all cases, domestic interest group sup-
port for the President. 24 The pressure of U.S. trade deficits during the
1980s propelled the trade negotiators to improve the U.S. balance of
payments with these export-promoting settlement agreements.2 5 At
least nominally (though interviewees rarely mentioned these goals),
negotiators also had the goal of increasing, or at least maintaining,
domestic employment levels.
U.S. trade negotiators also aimed to achieve several milieu goals.
In eight of the nine cases, U.S. negotiators' purpose was to move East
Asian State practice closer to compliance with GATT (Japan foot-
wear, Japan tobacco, Korea footwear, Korea beef, Taiwan footwear,
Taiwan rice) or in the direction of emerging GATT norms (Korea
insurance, Korea intellectual property). Only in the Japan semicon-
ductor agreement (with the twenty percent market-share commitment
from the Japanese government) 26 did U.S. negotiators aim to produce
a GATT non-compliant settlement.
23. Interviews by author (Dec. 1989-Apr. 1990).
24. Interviews by author (Dec. 1989-Apr. 1990).
25. Interviews by author (Dec. 1989-Apr. 1990).
26. See Letter from Ambassador Matsunaga, infra note 79.
[Vol. 12:799
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However, achievement of these goals through dispute settlement
agreements probably came at the expense of friendly diplomatic rela-
tions, since trade dispute settlement of this type creates diplomatic
friction under even the best of circumstances. The United States is, in
disputes such as these, demanding changes in a government's trade
policies. Trade policy changes typically have economic, social, and
political costs for which the East Asian governments must bear re-
sponsibility. Indeed, some interviewees representing the East Asian
governments complained bitterly about some of the dispute
outcomes.
27
To summarize then, evidence from the case studies indicates that,
most of the time, U.S. trade negotiators were able to make achieve-
ment of possession goals-such as enhancing commercial competitive-
ness, assuring domestic interest group support, increasing domestic
employment, and improving the U.S. balance of international pay-
ments-complement the milieu goal of strengthening the GATT.
Only in the Japan semiconductor case did achievement of possession
goals contradict the milieu goal of strengthening the GATT.
Yet all these U.S. national goals will not be achieved unless the
East Asian States comply with the settlement agreements. The com-
pliance record of the nine cases is presented in Table 3.
Substantial compliance with the settlement agreements by the East
Asian States was achieved in seven of the nine cases: Japan footwear,
Japan tobacco, Korea footwear, Korea beef, Korea insurance, Taiwan
footwear, and Taiwan rice. Substantial compliance means that the
East Asian States completely or nearly completely implemented the
terms of the agreement. Hence, in a large percentage of cases, U.S.
trade negotiators were able to achieve the important negotiation goal
of drafting an agreement that receives substantial compliance.
Nevertheless, two of the agreements (Japan semiconductor and
Korea intellectual property) did not result in substantial compliance.
Why? What factors explain compliance and noncompliance with bi-
lateral trade dispute settlement agreements? These questions are ad-
dressed in the next three sections of this paper.
III. NEGOTIATION STRATEGY AND BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS
Though firm trade policy behavior is under-researched, 28 Ameri-
27. Interviews by author, #9009 (Apr. 26, 1990), #9018 (Apr. 27, 1990), #9036 (Sept. 8,
1990).
28. For literature on firm trade policy behavior, see R. BAUER, I. DE SOLA POOL, & A,
DEXTER, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY 105-243 (1972); AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION (J. Zysman & L. Tyson eds. 1983); H. MILNER, RESISTING
Summer 199 11
Michigan Journal of International Law
Table 3
CASE COMPLIANCE RECORD
case compliance record compliance
yes/no
Japan footwear quota eliminated yes
Japan tobacco tariff eliminated yes
Japan semiconductor 20% share not met no
Korea insurance licenses granted yes
Korea intell. prop. weak enforcement no
Korea footwear tariff lowered; licensing yes
transparent'
Korea beef quota eliminated yes
Taiwan footwear tariff lowered yes
Taiwan rice exports to small markets yes
can businesses apparently seek bilateral trade dispute settlement be-
cause their competitiveness is threatened by a foreign competitor. The
threat may be from fair competition (as in an escape clause case) or
from (allegedly) unfair competition (as in an antidumping, counter-
vailing duty, section 337, or section 301 case). American businesses in
the Pacific Basin trade disputes studied here sought to enhance their
competitiveness in East Asian markets. They went to USTR under
the section 301 trade-remedy process with their complaints and peti-
tioned for help.
Pursuant to section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, as amended in
1979, 1984, and 1988, USTR has the authority to:
(A) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, benefits of
trade agreement concessions ... ;
(B) impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods of...
such foreign country; or
(C) enter into binding agreements with such foreign country that
commit such foreign country to
(i) eliminate, or phase out, the act, policy, or practice that is the
subject of the action to be taken [by USTR]. 29
USTR is also authorized to take "all other appropriate and feasible
PROTECTIONISM (1988); Milner & Yoffie, Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic
Trade Policy and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands, 43 INT'L ORG. 239 (1989).
29. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (c) (1988). A useful reference to trade law is HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS
& MEANS, OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES, H.R. Doc. No. 14, 101st
Cong., ist Sess. 379 (1989) [hereinafter Overview].
(Vol. 12:799
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action within the power of the President," 30 i.e., even retaliate, against
a foreign government to aid a U.S. firm or industry that has been vic-
timized by unfair foreign trade practices. If USTR determines that
(A) the rights of the United States under any trade agreement are
being denied; or
(B) an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country
(i) violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of, or other-
wise denies benefits to the United States under, any trade agree-
ment, or
(ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States com-
merce, then
USTR must take action.31 If USTR determines that "an act, policy,
or practice of a foreign country is unreasonable or discriminatory and
burdens or restricts United States commerce," USTR may take ac-
tion. 32 Section 301 was amended in 1984 so that "commerce" includes
service trade and foreign investment in addition to merchandise
trade.33
According to statutory dictate, the formal process of taking action
under section 301 begins with a petition to or a self-initiation by
USTR.34 The actual process, however, typically begins before a for-
mal petition is filed at USTR, with an informal meeting between repre-
sentatives of the industry and their trade lawyer (usually), and
representatives of USTR.3 5 USTR representation typically consists of
members of the general counsel's office, the area office, and the sector
office. At this informal meeting or meetings, the American firm or
industry informs USTR staff that it believes it is the victim of unfair
trade practices.
For example, the trade lawyer for the Rice Millers Association
might arrange a meeting with the USTR associate general counsel, a
representative from the Asia and Pacific office, and a representative
from the agriculture office to complain about Taiwanese rice policies.
The trade lawyer would explain the problem and convey to USTR the
importance of the issue to the Rice Millers Association. USTR, for its
30. 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(a) (1988).
31. Id.
32. Id., § 2411(b).
33. Overview, supra note 29, at 382.
34. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a), (b) (1988).
35. Interviews by author, #9006 (Apr. 26, 1990), #9011 (Apr. 24, 1990), #9027 (Dec. 12,
1989). A useful outline of the procedures under section 301 is contained in Bello & Holmer,
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Requirements, Procedures, and Developments, 7 Nw. J.
INT'L. L & Bus. 633, 645-653 (1986).
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part, explains whether the problem has been discussed with the
Taiwanese in the past, the Taiwanese position, the bilateral foreign
policy milieu, and USTR's preferred course of action.
Unless USTR determines that U.S. rights under a trade agreement
have been denied or that the foreign country has acted unjustifiably
and burdened U.S. commerce, thus requiring mandatory action by
USTR, staff at USTR may decide that the complaint is without foun-
dation and therefore merits no action. USTR may try to resolve a
trade problem through informal bilateral negotiations with the other
government. However, if the informal bilateral talks do not bear fruit,
then USTR staff may discuss with industry representatives and trade
lawyers the possibility of a formal section 301 petition-filing.
By rule of custom at USTR, trade lawyers for a firm or industry
contemplating a section 301 petition-filing send a draft petition around
USTR for comments.3 6 It is the rare section 301 petition which ar-
rives at USTR unannounced. For example, USTR staff were not sur-
prised by any of the petitions filed in the cases studied here. In fact,
three of the section 301 cases studied here were initiated by USTR
(Japan tobacco, Korea insurance, and Korea intellectual property),
while in two other cases, USTR invited petitions (Semiconductor In-
dustry Association against Japan and American Meat Institute against
Korea).37 USTR is statutorily required to review petitions and deter-
mine within forty-five days whether to initiate an investigation.38
The theory of organizations as applied to foreign policy-making by
Morton Halperin shows that an organization's behavior reflects its in-
stitutional mission.39 The mission of USTR includes (1) representing
the United States in multilateral trade negotiations, (2) acting as an
international agent for American business in section 301 actions, and
(3) advising the President on foreign trade policy.4° The second aspect
of the mission means that the needs of American business influence
U.S. trade negotiators. The first and third aspects of the USTR mis-
sion, however, require the needs of American business to be balanced
against milieu goals and the President's domestic and foreign policy
goals.
Several factors apparently influence USTR decisionmakers when
determining whether to initiate a case. First, is the case "winnable"
and at what cost? Second, can this case serve a bilateral or multilat-
36. Bello & Holmer, supra note 35, at 645.
37. Interviews by author, #9008 (Apr. 27, 1990), #9030 (Apr. 24, 1990).
38. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1988).
39. M. HALPERIN, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY 26 (1974).
40. See, e.g., I. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS (1986).
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eral strategic purpose? Third, how strong is political support for the
industry within the Executive branch and Congress? Fourth, will
other U.S. government agencies and the Departments of State, Treas-
ury, Defense, and the National Security Counsel object for foreign pol-
icy reasons to the trade dispute initiation? Fifth, does the alleged
unfair trade activity violate GATT or some other bilateral or multilat-
eral treaty?
At USTR, winning is highly valued. Advised one staff member:
"Think of us as like a prosecutor's office. Prosecutors love to win and
hate to lose; we look for cases that we can win. You don't get ahead
around here by losing."'4 1 A case involving a GATT violation may be
the easiest type of case to win. A case without a GATT violation
tends to be more difficult, though not impossible, to win. Hence, the
opinion of the USTR general counsel's office on the international le-
gality of the allegedly unfair trade activity weighs heavily in the deci-
sion to initiate or not to initiate the section 301 process.
The USTR negotiator plans a bargaining strategy which is most
likely to move the East Asian government toward an optimal settle-
ment agreement. If the East Asian government's trade practice clearly
or probably violates GATT, then usually the best strategy is to push
the legal argument. This is best because East Asian States find excel-
lent "political cover" in being able to explain to their affected business
communities and citizens that they conceded to the compunction of
international norms, not to the compelling force of U.S. power.
The GATT strategy is also best because the East Asian negotiators
realize that U.S. resolve to press its case is at its highest level when
international law is on its side. As an American trade negotiator em-
phasized, "We had justice on our side; they knew we weren't going
away on this one."' 42 Indeed, one Japanese official opined, "GATT is
key; it may determine win or lose for the U.S. If the U.S. has a strong
GATT case, the case will go differently. The U.S. can use GATT as a
very effective tool."'4
3
Contracting Parties to the GATT may take their bilateral trade
problems before a GATT panel or working party. The GATT dispute
settlement mechanisms are often criticized by government policymak-
ers and businesspeople for being slow, for issuing inconclusive final
reports, and for unfairly ratifying the power relationship of the dispu-
tants.44 Furthermore, not only is GATT unable to enforce a panel
41. Interview by author, #9027 (Dec. 12, 1989).
42. Interview by author, #9033 (Apr. 26, 1990).
43. Interview by author, #9014 (Dec. 15, 1989).
44. Jackson, Dispute Settlement Techniques Between Nations Concerning Economic Rela-
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determination, but according to John Jackson, "[iut appears there is no
legal obligation to carry out a panel finding. ... ,,45 Because the pres-
ent study is not devoted to an examination of GATT dispute settle-
ment, the research has not been designed to systematically test the
propositions of these critics.46
Nevertheless, the two cases in this study that were taken to GATT
for formal dispute settlement-Japan leather/footwear 7 and Korea
beef4g-suggest that GATT dispute settlement can achieve more than
its critics realize. These cases suggest that a GATT panel finding
against a State can be critical to eventual settlement of particularly
thorny disputes. Without GATT leverage over Japan for its leather
and footwear policies and over Korea for its beef policies, U.S. negoti-
ators would not have been able to reach settlements. Said one U.S.
negotiator about the Japan case: "We said to the Japanese: 'You are
wrong; you will lose.' A GATT loss would allow them to sell it at
home." 49
In some cases, USTR initiates a section 301 investigation, as it did
against Japan for its leather and footwear policies and against Korea
for its beef, insurance, and intellectual property policies, precisely be-
cause successful settlement serves a bilateral or multilateral strategic
purpose. The bilateral strategic purpose in these cases was to further
bilateral free trade: once Japan and Korea lost their justifications for
quotas on leather, footwear, and beef, they lost justifications for all
other quotas.
The multilateral strategic purpose in the Korea insurance and in-
tellectual property cases was to get Korean support for newly emerg-
ing norms in the GATT. Once Korea opened its insurance market, its
national interests moved significantly toward support for a GATT for
service trade; once Korea strengthened its intellectual property laws,
tions- With Special Emphasis on GA TT, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 39, 66 (T. Carbonneau ed. 1984); Plank, An Unofficial Descrip-
tion of How a GATT Panel Works and Does Not, 4 J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 1987, at 53, 92-93; H.
HAZARD, RESOLVING DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 167-181 (1990).
45. Jackson, supra note 44, at 50.
46. For work in this area, see Davey, Dispute Settlement in GAIT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
51 (1987); R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (2d ed.
1990).
47. GATT Panel Report on Japanese Leather Import Quotas, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1082 (June 19, 1984). The United States requested application of the conclusions reached by the
panel on Japanese leather import quotas to the leather footwear quota as well. See U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, SECTION 301 TABLE OF CASES, supra note 12, at 49:0846.
48. CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCu-
MENTS Supp. No. 36, at 268 (1990) (Panel Decision on Korean Beef Imports) [hereinafter Ko-
rean Beef Panel].
49. Interview by author, #9033 (Apr. 26, 1990).
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its national interests were served by stronger GATT laws regarding
intellectual property. Since a key U.S. goal in the Uruguay Round of
GATT multilateral trade negotiations was to write new GATT law
regarding service trade and intellectual property, and the attainment
of this goal depended, in large part, on the United States getting the
support of the big developing countries, USTR believed that pressing
the Korean government bilaterally would help multilateral efforts at
GATT rule formulation. In this way, the U.S. pursuit of possession
goals promoted milieu goals as well.
To summarize, USTR considers the bilateral and multilateral stra-
tegic value of a petition before initiating formal trade dispute settle-
ment procedures. A Deputy U.S. Trade Representative made explicit
the initiation policy pursued at USTR during the 1980s: "Our [third]
strategy has been to concentrate, to the extent possible, on sectors that
will have 'ripple' effects .... 5.
Studies of the foreign policymaking of Executive branch bureau-
cracies in the United States show that domestic political issues influ-
ence decision-making.5" In the American political system, the
President seeks to possess influence sufficient to achieve his policy
objectives. Yet, the President's political influence grows and dimin-
ishes with events. The political appointees who head Executive
Branch agencies owe an allegiance to the President and thus make
policy with an eye toward its effects on domestic interest groups and
constituencies important to the President.
All U.S. administration interviewees (and many outside the U.S.
government) in this study noted domestic politics as a factor in the
USTR trade dispute initiation decision-making process. Yet, as this
study shows, in a finding that may surprise some observers, possession
goals such as interest group support typically are secondary to the fac-
tors discussed above (winning, strategic purpose, and GATT milieu
goals). Only in the semiconductor dispute with Japan did domestic
political and economic possession goals and pressures override these
other factors.
USTR considers the foreign policy implications of a trade dispute
initiation with a Pacific Basin government as well. One interviewee
remarked, "At one time the State Department put so much pressure
on us during Japanese elections that we didn't even talk to [Japanese
50. United States-Japan Trade Issues with Emphasis on Structural Impediments Initiative:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990) (statement of S. Linn Williams, Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative).
51. See M. HALPERIN, supra note 39, at 26-62.
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government representatives] about trade problems."' 52 However, the
cases studied here show that, by the mid-1980s, a consensus had been
reached within the foreign policy bureaucracies in the Executive
Branch, that trade policy is foreign policy. Thus, bilateral foreign pol-
icy concerns during this time period only weakly influence USTR's
section 301 initiation decisions.
However, the preservation of friendly bilateral trade and diplo-
matic relations is apparently important to USTR negotiators. As
noted above, trade policy change is made only with political, eco-
nomic, and social cost. In several of the cases, U.S. negotiators sought
to offer "political cover" to the East Asian governments involved
through the use of GATT compliance legitimacy strategy or some
other mechanism. Note for example, the GATT panel decision in the
Japan leather/footwear dispute that allows the Japanese government
to "sell it at home,"53 and the preservation of the Taiwanese right to
sell subsidized rice in small country markets.
Nevertheless, section 301 requires that USTR take action against a
foreign government if the investigation ends with the conclusion that
unfair activity exists.5 4 Section 301 also authorizes USTR to retaliate
by suspending or withdrawing trade benefits to that foreign country,
or imposing quotas on the imported goods of the foreign country. 55
Because the statute requires mandatory action in certain circum-
stances and authorizes the use of U.S. economic power, section 301
can be an effective tool of U.S. trade policy. However, for the same
reasons, section 301 can disrupt bilateral relations between the United
States and the foreign government. East Asian States loathe being ac-
cused of unfair trade activity by USTR and fear the threat of economic
sanctions. For these reasons, the section 301 process is a foreign pol-
icy tool to be used judiciously. As one interviewee stated, "It must be
used with finesse." 56
IV. CASE EVIDENCE
The cases illustrate the dynamics of the USTR decision-making
process regarding trade dispute initiation-"winning," strategic pur-
pose, domestic politics, foreign policy, and GATT. Selected aspects of
the trade disputes studied in this research are reviewed here.
52. Interview by author, #9002 (Dec. 12, 1990).
53. GATT Panel Report on Japanese Leather Import Quotas, supra note 47.
54. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1988).
55. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c) (1988).
56. Interview by author, #9006 (Apr. 26, 1990).
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Footwear Industries complained of unfair trade policies toward
non-rubber footwear by the governments of Japan, Korea, Taiwan,
Brazil, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, as well as the
European Community as a whole. 57 The heart of the petition was the
claim that restrictions by Europe and Japan diverted shoe exports by
the other named States to the "open" U.S. footwear market. 58 Foot-
wear Industries confronted USTR with a morass of issues and
problems.
World footwear markets are huge. 9 Shoe-making is labor inten-
sive while start-up capital costs are relatively low. Hence, developing
countries, typically labor-rich and cash-poor, have found good invest-
ment opportunities in shoe-making. 6° The large U.S. consumer mar-
ket invites developing country footwear exports. As a result, since the
late 1960s, U.S. shoe producers have faced ever-growing foreign com-
petition for U.S. footwear retailers. Between 1965 and 1977, imports
increased from twelve percent of the U.S. market to forty-nine per-
cent. 61 Imports reached fifty-one percent of the market in 1976.62 Be-
tween 1968 and 1983 over 350 shoe factories in the United States
closed.63 Still, the industry failed to get much U.S. government help.
The U.S. footwear industry petitioned the International Trade
Commission (ITC) for escape clause protection and trade adjustment
assistance at least 355 times between 1973 and 1978. 64 Though the
footwear industry found some sympathetic supporters in Congress, it
failed to generate much support from the Executive Branch. How-
ever, in 1977, on the heels of another escape clause finding by the ITC
that footwear imports had, in fact, caused injury to domestic produ-
cers and thus the industry was entitled to relief, the industry suc-
ceeded in getting the Carter Administration to negotiate an Orderly
Marketing Arrangement (OMA) with Korea and Taiwan, the two
largest importers.
65
The OMA, which expired in June 1981, resulted in more competi-
tion for U.S. producers (from Brazil, Spain, Italy, and Hong Kong,
whose firms exploited the market opportunities created when quotas
57. Footwear petition, supra note 13.
58. Id.
59. The information in this paragraph is taken from Yoffie, Adjustment in the Footwear In-
dustry, in AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION, supra note 28, at 313-49.
60. Id. at 325.
61. Id. at 324.
62. H. MILNER, supra note 28, at 104.
63. Yoffie, supra note 59, at 323.
64. H. MILNER, supra note 28, at 106.
65. Id. at 108.
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were placed on Korean and Taiwanese imports), better competition
(from Korea and Taiwan, whose firms were prompted to become more
efficient and move up-market), even lower U.S. market share than
before, and even lower U.S. employment levels.66 The industry needed
a new strategy, one which promised to provide comprehensive protec-
tion. The section 301 trade remedy provided that range of
opportunity.
Footwear Industries filed the section 301 petition with USTR only
days before the November 1982 Congressional elections. The petition
was ushered in by identical letters to USTR signed by fifty Senators
and 111 Representatives urging acceptance of the petition.67 Never-
theless, USTR rejected the petition's European trade-diversion argu-
ment. However, USTR did agree that there was evidence that the
Japanese footwear market was closed to exports from the United
States and other countries and that Japanese footwear policies merited
investigation. With respect to Taiwan and Korea, USTR found evi-
dence of several relatively minor GATT violations and high, though
technically GATT-compliant, tariffs. USTR agreed to take up these
issues with each country.
In rejecting the trade diversion argument, USTR kept its policy
consistent with GATT practice: GATT has never accepted the trade
diversion argument. Despite intense Congressional and footwear-in-
dustry pressure, the Executive resisted employing the section 301 lev-
erage under a trade diversion argument to protect the U.S. footwear
industry. Instead, it pursued only those issues where it believed a
GATT violation existed.
The GATT panel decision in the leather/footwear dispute between
the United States and Japan illustrates the utility of GATT as a nego-
tiating tool and the bureaucratic prominence of the USTR general
counsel's office in such cases. The USTR negotiators needed a bar-
gaining strategy to challenge the Japanese negotiating strategy on
leather and footwear market-opening, a strategy which the Japanese
had used in the tobacco and semiconductor disputes as well. One
trade negotiator described Japan's strategy during the leather and
footwear cases as a "dribble out" strategy;68 another trade negotiator
was thinking of the tobacco case when opining that the Japanese
"open markets we can't make any money in and open slowly markets
that we can make money in. By letting the American industry make
66. Yoffie, supra note 59, at 344-45; H. MILNER, supra note 28, at 104.
67. Letter to Ambassador Brock from members of Congress (Sept. 29, 1982) (available in
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Public file #301-36).
68. Interview by author, #9033 (Apr. 26, 1990).
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more money, they think they can appease it."69
For example, the Japanese government took the following tack in
bilateral trade dispute negotiations over leather, footwear, tobacco,
and semiconductors. First, they denied for many months that there
was a trade problem at all. Second, they admitted that the U.S. gov-
ernment perceived a bilateral trade problem, though it was illusory.
Third, a bilateral "study group" was formed to investigate the "prob-
lem." After many more months, the study group drew ambiguous
conclusions and recommended small policy changes. Fourth, they
bargained for many months over these minor Japanese policy changes.
Fifth, they finally made minor concessions. The result was incremen-
tal policy changes which minimized the impact of the negotiations on
the Japanese economy, business, and society.
In the leather and footwear disputes with Japan, USTR deter-
mined that the best strategy was to press the Japanese government
hard that its policies violated GATT. USTR determined that a
GATT panel finding against Japan, over its leather and footwear quo-
tas, would bring international normative pressure to bear on Japan to
end the quotas. In addition, a GATT panel finding against Japanese
quotas on leather goods could be used as precedent in negotiations
over tobacco as well as other products.
This negotiation strategy, however, was opposed by many in the
Executive Branch, especially in the Treasury and State Departments,
but in USTR as well. These policymakers opposed "legalizing" bilat-
eral trade dispute settlement. They placed a higher value on the goal
of friendly diplomatic relations with the Japanese government and re-
jected a policy that would cause the Japanese government to "lose
face" internationally. The Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, how-
ever, argued within the Administration that only by legalizing the pro-
cess could the United States get Japan to open its markets. The
"legalize it" argument prevailed and the general counsel's office was
asked to prepare an "airtight" GATT case against the government of
Japan over its leather and footwear policies.
The USTR lawyers argued before the GATT panel successfully
and the panel held against Japan. 70 Indeed, one participant remarked,
"The Japanese knew they were beaten; they didn't even put up a de-
fense in GATT. 71 The Japanese quotas were held up as an unfair
trade practice before the world by a legitimate international institu-
69. Interview by author, #9007 (Apr. 24, 1990).
70. GAIT Panel Report on Japanese Leather Import Quotas, supra note 47.
71. Interview by author, #9027 (Dec. 12, 1989).
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tion. The GATT victory legitimized the U.S. position in the eyes of
the world trading community and enhanced with the Japanese the
credibility of the U.S. threat to use economic sanctions in pursuit of its
goals. After the GATT panel victory against Japan for its leather and
footwear quotas, USTR pressed Japan to eliminate quotas in one mar-
ket after another. The GATT victory in leather/footwear ultimately
doomed all Japanese quotas.
The leather/footwear case, then, served a strategic purpose greater
than its immediate trade value (which was small). USTR's GATT
case against Japanese leather and footwear import policies was the first
attempt to make the Japanese political economy conform with the
rules and principles of the GATT and of liberal market political eco-
nomic ideology. USTR pressed the GATT case against Japan in a
relatively inconsequential market because a victory would offer the
United States additional leverage in future negotiations over other
products. A U.S. trade policymaker said, "Leather and footwear was
[a] medium to attack the Japanese system. '' 72 Another U.S. poli-
cymaker mused, "Nobody would have believed then that it would re-
sult in 1990 with the Structural Impediments Initiative. Now we are
demanding the complete restructuring of the Japanese economy."
'73
The precedential value of a GATT panel finding is also illustrated
by the Korea beef case. The Korean government employed every dip-
lomatic effort to prevent the formation of a GATT panel to investigate
the beef case. Their justification for quotas on beef was the same as
their justification for quotas on many other products, the so-called bal-
ance of payments exception. 74
GATT permits the maintenance of import quotas in order to pro-
tect a country against balance of payments deficits. The U.S. position
was that, by the end of the 1980s, the Korean balance of payments was
in surplus and the surplus was growing each year, and thus Korea
should no longer be permitted to use the GATT balance of payments
exception to legitimize its quotas. However, USTR determined that it
needed authoritative multilateral, not unilateral, action in order to
convince the Korean government to change its policy. For Korea, on
the other hand, if beef were lost, and it was, since a GATT panel ruled
against Korea, 75 the justification for the other quotas would be lost as
well. Thus, the normative pressure of GATT mattered to both Japan
and Korea.
72. Interview by author, #9033 (Apr. 26, 1990).
73. Interview by author, #9007 (Apr. 24, 1990).
74. GATT, supra note 2, art. XII.
75. See Korean Beef Panel, supra note 48.
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The significance of the normative pressure of GATT is not dimin-
ished because, in both the Japan and Korea cases, the United States
ultimately found it necessary to threaten economic sanctions to get
settlements. Rather, the need for the show of U.S. power underscores
the importance to the Japanese and Korean governments of the trade
practices at issue. Indeed, it points out that GATT tends to get the
really tough cases, the ones in which the stakes are truly high.
The charge that GATT dispute settlement is slow-it typically
takes about a year-withers when compared to the alternatives. The
leather/footwear dispute between the United States and Japan had
dragged on for years before it was taken to GATT. Trade diplomacy
is not for the impatient. Indeed, the business firm or industry which
depends upon quick government action for survival is doomed.
GATT dispute settlement should be seen as a tool of negotiation
which, if used judiciously, can be influential leverage against unfair
trade practices.
From the perspective of USTR, the disputes with Japan over
leather, footwear, and tobacco were about changing the Japanese
political economy so that it conformed with the GATT. The semicon-
ductor dispute illustrates the incompatibility of the Japanese political
economy with that of the United States. However, the dispute exposes
the limits of GATT law, which was written between the 1940s and
1970s by Americans and Europeans schooled in traditional market ec-
onomics. The traditional economic model, on which GATT is based,
envisions a market of simple manufactured goods, but must be applied
in the 1980s and 1990s to high technology trade and to political econo-
mies that do not conform to traditional liberal models.
One participant remarked about the dispute: "We could never
find the smoking gun; we could never find the GATT violation, but we
knew we should have had a bigger share of [the Japanese] market.
''76
In the beginning, U.S. negotiators sought to open Japanese markets for
American (and all foreign) semiconductor makers, in addition to pur-
suing dumping issues, which are not studied here. Without clear evi-
dence of GATT-noncompliant market barriers, USTR was forced to
give up. They opted for results: "Give us twenty percent of your
market." 77
The Semiconductor Arrangement 78 signed in September 1986,
which "settled" the dispute, made only cautious commitments to "an-
76. Interview by author, #9033 (Apr. 26, 1990).
77. Interviews by author, #9008 (Apr. 27, 1990), #9027 (Dec. 12, 1989), #9033 (Apr. 26,
1990).
78. Arrangement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United
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ticipate," to "impress," to "improve gradually and steadily" foreign
firm market access. However, a once confidential letter from Ambas-
sador Matsunaga to Ambassador Yeutter was attached to the public
treaty. 79 The existence of the letter and its contents leaked out to both
the Japanese and American press. The letter explicitly recognizes a
twenty percent target for foreign semiconductor market share.
The letter states,
The Government of Japan recognizes the U.S. semiconductor industry's
expectation that semiconductor sales in Japan of foreign capital-affiliated
companies will grow to at least slightly above 20 percent of the Japanese
market in five years. The Government of Japan considers that this can
be realized and welcomes its realization.8
0
A "recognition" of an "expectation" may not be a commitment, how-
ever. Also, the letter continues, "The attainment of such an expecta-
tion depends on competitive factors, the sales efforts of the foreign
capital-affiliated companies, the purchasing efforts of the semiconduc-
tor users in Japan and the efforts of both Governments."' This clause
leaves much room to maneuver if the target market share is not met.
It is easy to criticize the Semiconductor Arrangement for its inade-
quacies. However, many of the negotiators for the semiconductor dis-
pute also negotiated the well-drafted and successfully implemented
settlements to the leather/footwear and tobacco disputes. Why the
different outcomes? In the leather/footwear case, USTR demon-
strated that Japanese policy violated GATT and, certain of its norma-
tive position, pushed the Japanese government hard. In the tobacco
case, USTR, having pressed the Japanese government for years to
change their GATT-violating policies and having finally achieved
most of these objectives, demanded the elimination of a GATT-com-
pliant tariff. But, whether it is GATT-compliant or not, a tariff is a
readily apparent trade barrier. With a tariff, USTR can point to a
"smoking gun." In the semiconductor case, USTR could point to no
smoking gun. Hence, USTR could do no better than to fashion an
agreement that might enhance the commercial competitiveness of a
vital U.S. industry, even if it violated the spirit of the GATT.
Nevertheless, rarely did USTR disregard milieu goals in favor of
States of America Concerning Trade in Semiconductor Products, Sept. 2, 1986, United States-
Japan.
79. Letter from Ambassador Matsunaga to Ambassador Yeutter, quoted in Identification of
Japan's Failure to Abide by the Semiconductor Agreement, Submission before the United States
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possession goals during its application of section 301 in the Pacific
Basin in the 1980s (with the Japan semiconductor case as the only
example among the nine case studies). Indeed, USTR typically pro-
moted milieu goals in support of possession goals.-
V. COMPLIANCE AND UNILATERAL SURVEILLANCE
This study shows that substantial compliance with bilateral trade
dispute settlement agreements will likely be achieved under the follow-
ing conditions: (1) expected trade behavior is clearly specified, (2) ex-
pected trade behavior is implementable, (3) effective monitoring
procedures are provided in order to detect noncompliance, and (4)
positive and/or negative incentives for compliance are offered. As Ta-
ble 3 shows, seven of the nine settlement agreements received substan-
tial compliance by the East Asian governments. Two settlements,
however, did not: Japan semiconductor and Korea intellectual
property.
The first condition-clear specification of expected trade behav-
ior-was met by eight of the nine settlement agreements. (See Table
2.) For example, the Japanese government committed itself in the set-
tlement agreement regarding tobacco to eliminate a tariff. The Ko-
rean government agreed to license foreign firms to sell certain types of
insurance in Korea in settling the insurance dispute. The Taiwanese
government committed itself to ensuring that Taiwanese rice would be
exported only to small countries. Even the agreement that settled the
dispute with Japan over semiconductor market access clearly specified
the expected behavior. Only in the Korea intellectual property settle-
ment was expected behavior inadequately specified.
A trade negotiator explained "clear specification": "Clarity de-
mands that you say 'two years,' not 'over a reasonable period of
time.' ",82 The agreement between the United States and Korea on in-
tellectual property, however, fails to meet that standard in some of its
important provisions. Regarding protection for sound recordings, the
agreement states, "[p]rotection of sound recordings.., against unau-
thorized reproduction, importation and distribution will be strength-
ened through stricter enforcement of Korea's Phonogram Law. ...
The ROKG will strengthen penalties against copyright infringe-
ment .... Through administrative guidance, printed materials copy-
righted in the United States... will be prevented from unauthorized
reproduction, publication, and distribution .... ,,83 The agreement's
82. Interview by author, #9021 (Dec. 14, 1989).
83. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, RECORD OF UNDERSTANDING ON INTELLECTUAL
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treatment of patent and trademark issues is similarly ambiguous.
Noncompliance resulted.
According to the International Intellectual Property Alliance, ex-
tensive copyright violations continued in Korea after the agreement
was reached in the summer of 1986.84 Korean attorneys hired by the
Alliance discovered that Korean pirate publishers had dumped $2 mil-
lion worth of textbooks on the Korean college market in February
1988. Pirating also persisted in videocassettes, records, and computer
software. Korean enforcement efforts appeared to the Alliance to be
minimal and they urged USTR to pressure the Korean government to
enforce their intellectual property laws.
American pharmaceutical companies remained dissatisfied with
treaty compliance as well. Squibb and Bristol-Myers filed new section
301 complaints with USTR.8 5 They charged that Korean companies
were pirating their products, often with the help of a Korean govern-
ment-funded research center. As a result of these compliance
problems, in May 1989 USTR placed Korea, along with Brazil, India,
Mexico, China, and Thailand, on its priority watch list of violators on
intellectual property rights under the Special 301 provision of the 1988
Trade Act.8
6
The second condition--expected trade behavior that can be imple-
mented, i.e., the government possesses the political capacity to do
what it has committed itself to doing-was also met in eight of the
nine agreements. In the footwear case, the Japanese government com-
mitted itself to eliminating a quota, and in the tobacco case, to elimi-
nating a tariff. The expected trade behavior was implementable by the
Japanese government. The agreement commitments in the other cases
were also implementable by the East Asian governments. However, in
the semiconductor dispute, the Japanese government (ambiguously
and in response to U.S. pressure) committed itself to helping U.S.
semiconductor-makers garner twenty percent of the Japanese market.
The Japanese government lacked the authority to implement its com-
mitment. Noncompliance resulted.
The same USTR negotiators who had drafted clearly specified and
implementable trade behaviors in all of the other cases did not draft
PROPERTY RIGHTS (available in U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Public File #301-52) (empha-
sis added).
84. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, TRADE LOSSES DUE TO
PIRACY AND OTHER MARKET ACCESS BARRIERS AFFECTING THE US COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES
36-37 (1989).
85. Interview by author, #9031 (Apr. 25, 1990).
86. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1990 TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE
BARRIERS 19, 40, 90, 133, 144, 193 (1990).
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such agreements in the Japanese semiconductor and Korean intellec-
tual property cases. What can account for this? The likely explana-
tion is USTR's possession goal of interest group support. Political
pressure may lead negotiators to "paper over" a dispute with a weak
agreement.
The third condition-effective monitoring procedures for detecting
noncompliance-was met in all nine cases. Even in the Japan semi-
conductor and Korea intellectual property settlements, effective moni-
toring was provided. Indeed, monitoring in commercial treaties,
unlike in arms control, is apparently relatively simple, but still very
expensive.
In arms control, the U.S. government itself takes primary responsi-
bility for monitoring Soviet compliance with bilateral treaties through
national technical means. The U.S. government does so because no
credibly competent international institutions exist which are able to
effectively monitor compliance. In much the same way, the U.S. gov-
ernment must undertake responsibility for monitoring compliance
with trade agreements. The GATT, in theory charged by its members
with providing surveillance of national trade policies and compliance
with GATT rules, in reality possesses weak surveillance and enforce-
ment capability. Hence, in both arms control and trade policy, the
United States must provide unilateral surveillance to insure treaty
compliance.
USTR, unlike the Department of Commerce, has no staff officers
whose mission is to insure implementation of and compliance with
trade agreements. In fact, the Department of Commerce has one per-
son who does nothing but monitor Japanese semiconductor dumping
and price compliance with the Semiconductor Arrangement. Never-
theless, even the relatively large Commerce Department relies heavily
on U.S. industry for monitoring help. For example, the Semiconduc-
tor Arrangement requires industry monitoring to insure compliance;
the Department of Commerce lacks access to information to guarantee
compliance on its own. Thus, American business must actively moni-
tor compliance with agreements that affect it. USTR has relied on the
Semiconductor Industry Association, the Pharmaceutical Manufac-
turers Association, and the International Intellectual Property Alli-
ance to detect noncompliance with the applicable settlement
agreements.
The fourth condition-positive and/or negative incentives for
compliance-was met to some degree in all nine cases. Due to the
political and diplomatic asymmetry in the relationships between the
East Asian governments and the United States, the East Asian govern-
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ments in bilateral trade disputes always have a positive incentive to
improve overall bilateral relations with the United States by signing
and complying with a settlement agreement. They also have a nega-
tive incentive to sign and comply with an agreement: the threat of
losing U.S. markets. The East Asian States need unfettered access to
large U.S. consumer markets and thus loss of these markets is a credi-
ble economic sanction.
Furthermore, the East Asian States share with the United States
the milieu goal of a strong, GATT-based liberal international trading
system, because export-led economies depend upon open international
markets. Thus, the East Asian States strengthen the GATT system
when they settle and comply with the terms of agreements that put
their trade behavior into compliance with GATT.
However, because trade dispute settlement typically demands a
policy change that creates domestic losers, governments may have
strong incentives for non-compliance, as well. The trade negotiator
must not be misled into a casual agreement by the seeming willingness
of the leadership of the opposing government to comply. Non-compli-
ance can occur, despite the best intentions of senior political leaders, at
lower levels of the government, a phenomenon that one political scien-
tist has called "involuntary non-compliance, 87 but that may also be
called "bureaucratic non-compliance."
Although the bureaucracies in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are large
and hierarchically ordered, the lower levels of the bureaucracy have
ample discretion when implementing orders from the top.88 Cases
such as the Korea intellectual property case illustrate that even when
political leaders intend compliance, a large bureaucracy must still be
moved in support of the new policy. It would appear that settlement
agreements which call for bureaucratic action of this type must be set-
tled and monitored carefully to ensure compliance. On the other
hand, tariff and quota changes can apparently be implemented by a
government with little difficulty.
87. R. Keohane, Reciprocity, Reputation and Compliance with International Commitments
11, 33 (Sept. 4, 1988) (unpublished paper prepared for delivery at the 1988 Annual Meeting of
the American Political Science Association).
88. See, e.g., C. JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE 20-24, 44, 55-81 (1982)
(MITI is the primary Japanese government bureaucracy involved with trade policy); Johnson,
Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Ja-
pan, South Korea, and Taiwan, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIAL-
ISM 136, 151-56 (F. Deyo ed. 1987) (noting expertise, influence, and independence from political
leadership of Japanese, Taiwanese, and South Korean bureaucracy); H. TIEN, THE GREAT
TRANSITION: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 121-25 (1989)
(describing Taiwan's administrative bureaucracy).
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CONCLUSION
Grounded in theories of interstate conflict, foreign policy, arms
control, and bureaucratic politics, this paper has used the evidence of
the section 301 experience in the Pacific Basin to explain the U.S.
strategy of bilateral trade dispute settlement. The U.S. strategy aims
to achieve important national goals which may be described as either
milieu or possession goals.
The U.S. government typically attempts to promote the GATT-
based multilateral trading system as an important national milieu goal.
USTR, this study shows, typically carries out bilateral trade dispute
settlement with high regard for the GATT system. The Pacific Basin
experience with section 301 shows that the USTR strategy is to select
cases with "ripple effect," i.e., cases which will open more markets or
promote more GATT rule formulation. As an important possession
goal, staff at USTR also aim to enhance interest group support for
themselves and for the President.
The U.S. strategy also typically aims to achieve compliance with
the settlement agreements. This paper has specified the conditions
under which compliance is likely to occur. In doing so, this paper
shows that "covenants without the sword" need not be mere words.
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